quinta-feira, 30 de junho de 2016

Kissinger Culpa Obama pelo Brexit.

Como um diplomata experiente, talvez o mais experiente do mundo, Kissinger não iria condenar com palavras duras seu próprio presidente. E um diplomata costuma escrever de forma escorregadia. Mas ao lembrar no seu texto que Obama, quando em viagem ao Reino Unido, ameaçou o pessoal que pedia a saída do Reino Unido da União Europeia dizendo que se o Reino Unido saísse da União Europeia iria para o fim da linha nas negociações comerciais com os Estados Unidos. Kissinger está ao seu modo de diplomata que Obama é responsável também pelo Brexit. O povo britânico se sentiu ameaçado e reafirmou sua autonomia.

Cabe dizer que com o resultado do Brexit, Obama não reafirmou sua ameaça, pelo contrário, disse que o Reino Unido continuava como seu aliado especial.

Vejamos o texto de Kissinger publicado ontem no Wall Street Journal.

Out of the Brexit Turmoil: Opportunity

The cascade of commentary on Britain’s decision to leave institutional Europe has described the epochal event primarily in the vocabulary of calamity. However, the coin of the realm for statesmen is not anguish or recrimination; it should be to transform setback into opportunity.
The impact of the British vote is so profound because the emotions it reflects are not confined to Britain or even Europe. The popular reaction to European Union institutions (as reflected in public-opinion polls) is comparable in most major countries, especially France and Spain. The multilateral approach based on open borders for trade and the movement of peoples is increasingly being challenged, and now an act of direct democracy intended to reaffirm the status quo has rendered a damning verdict. However challenging this expression of popular sentiment, ignoring the concerns it manifests is a path to greater disillusionment.
Brexit is a classic illustration of the law of unintended consequences. The British government sought a Remain vote to end, once and for all, domestic disputes about Europe in a minority of the Conservative Party and among fringe populist groups. Many backers of the Leave campaign were surprised by their success, having understood their political mission initially in much less sweeping terms.
All these elements have been overwhelmed because the European vision elaborated over decades has been developing a sclerotic character. Internal debates of Europe have increasingly concentrated on structural contradictions. In the process, the vision that motivates sacrifice is weakening.
The founders of European unity understood the ultimate scope of their project. It was, on one level, a rejection of the worst consequences of European divisions, especially the traumatic wars that had killed tens of millions of Europeans in the 20th century alone. But it was also an affirmation of the values by which Europe had become great.
The Europe of the founders’ youth had thrived by the elaboration of the nation-state, which on one hand competed for pre-eminence, but at the same time evolved a common culture. Its principles of democracy and constitutionalism were spread around the world, even while respect for the dignity of the individual had been violated under colonialism. The European vision sought to maintain the dynamism reflected in Europe’s historical achievements while tempering the competition which had, by 1945, nearly led to their destruction.
Too much of the Europe of today is absorbed in management of structural problems rather than the elaboration of its purposes. From globalization to migration, the willingness to sacrifice is weakening. But a better future cannot be reached without some sacrifice of the present. A society reluctant to accept this verity stagnates and, over the decades, consumes its substance.
Inevitably a gap arises between the institutions and their responsibilities, which accounts for increasing populist pressures. The deepest challenge to the EU is not its management but its ultimate goals. In a world in which upheavals based on conflicting values span the continents, a common act of imagination by Europe and its Atlantic partners is badly needed.
Instead, European leadership is now faced with an unexpected challenge. Under the terms of its charter, the EU is obliged to negotiate with a principal member over the terms of withdrawal. Britain will want to maintain extensive ties with Europe while lifting or easing the constraints of its many legislative and bureaucratic requirements. The EU leadership has almost the opposite incentive. It will not wish to reward Britain’s Leave majority by granting Britain better terms than it enjoyed as a full member. Hence a punitive element is likely to be inherent in the EU bargaining position.
Many of us who have grown up with and admired the vision of European unity hope that the EU will transcend itself, by seeking its vocation not in penalizing the recalcitrant but by negotiating in a manner that restores the prospects of unity. The EU should not treat Britain as an escapee from prison but as a potential compatriot.
Punishing the U.K. will not solve the question of how to operate a common currency in the absence of a common fiscal policy among countries with disparate economic capacities, or of how to define a union whose ability to achieve common political strategies lags fundamentally behind its economic and administrative capacities.
By the same token, Britain needs to put forward the concept of autonomy for which its people voted in a manner that embraces ultimate cooperation. Britain and Europe together must consider how they might return, at least partially, to their historical role as shapers of international order.
In recent decades, Europe has retreated to the conduct of soft power. But besieged as it is on almost all frontiers by upheavals and migration, Europe, including Britain, can avoid turning into a victim of circumstance only by assuming a more active role. These vistas cannot yet be discussed at a geopolitical level, but the EU’s leaders should be able to form discrete and discreet panels for exploring them. In this manner, the Leave vote can serve as a catharsis.
The United States has encouraged the European Union from its beginning but has had difficulty adjusting to the achievement that followed. When the EU idea was first put forward by Jean Monnet at the end of World War II and advanced by the Marshall Plan, the U.S. was the indispensable contributor for international security and economic progress. Given the recovery of contemporary Europe, the American role needs to be redefined to a new kind of leadership, moving from dominance to persuasion.
The manner in which the U.S. administration and other advocates of Remain sought to influence the Brexit vote illustrates the point. The threat that without the support of Europe, a solitary Britain would move to the end of the line in negotiations with Washington reversed the historical sequence of that relationship. The “special relationship” is founded in the origins of America, in a common language and in a comparable system of political values reinforced by fighting together in common wars. The idea of the special relationship was enunciated by Winston Churchill not as a refutation of a multilateral world, but as the guarantor of its values in the hard times sure to follow World War II.
That special relationship is needed for the Atlantic world to traverse the present crisis. A disintegrating Europe could subside into an impotent passivity that will shrivel the entire Atlantic partnership, which represents one of the greatest achievements of the past century. Britain, in whatever mutually respectful legal status it arranges with Europe, is an essential element in this design. Its history and emotion are Atlantic; its current necessity requires as well a link to Europe. Today’s established international order was founded upon conceptions that emerged from the British Isles, were carried by Europe around the world, and ultimately took deep root in North America. American leadership in reinvigorating the contemporary order is imperative.
The Brexit vote has unleashed the anxieties of two continents and of all those who rely upon the stability that their union of purpose provides. The needed restoration of faith will not come through recriminations. To inspire the confidence of the world, Europe and America must demonstrate confidence in themselves.
Mr. Kissinger served as national-security adviser and secretary of state under PresidentsNixon and Ford.

segunda-feira, 27 de junho de 2016

Brexit e a Doutrina Social da Igreja Católica. Os Fundadores Católicos da União Europeia.

A União Europeia  logo no pós-guerra foi estimulado pela ideia de união em volta de valores do cristianismo, especialmente líderes católicos. Robert Schumann, Jean Monet, Konrad Adenauer e Alcide de Gasperi, eram devotos líderes católicos. Schumann (foto acima) e Gasperi estão inclusive em processo de canonização, eles advogaram o cristianismo europeu em defesa da Europa unida. Eles são considerados os fundadores da União Europeia.

Mas será que a atual União Europeia era o que eles tinham em mente? A União Europeia de hoje renega os valores cristãos em prol do que chama de valores seculares.

De que lado está a Doutrina da Igreja? Em que votariam os teólogos sociais da Igreja, ficar ou deixar a União Europeia? A Doutrina defende dois princípios: solidariedade e subsidiaridade. Os dois princípios precisam do cristianismo para se desenvolver apropriadamente.

Joanna Bogle no site Catholic.com escreveu um bom artigo sobre isso.

Vejam parte do texto de Joanna abaixo:

Brexit and Catholic Social Teaching

June 24, 2016 | 30 comments

Precursor of the EU
The European Community—or Common Market as it was called in Britain in the 1960s and ’70s when suggestions were first made about British membership—always included the notion of some form of full political unity and integration. But it seemed a distant possibility right up until the 1980s. Britain joined in the early ’70s amid promises that political unity would never happen. Suggestions that it was on the agenda were met with scoffs from enthusiasts for the European project.
Pope St. John Paul II spoke often and with passion about Europe, calling for a revival of the Christian faith that had shaped European culture and values. He lifted the whole debate about Europe—not only in his native Poland but also in the hearts of Catholics across the continent—to a different level. But did he insist on the need for full political integration? And was the European Union that emerged into the twenty-first century one consonant with Catholic values?
And so to Brexit. Spiritual values and Catholic social teaching did not feature in the campaign. The issues were political and economic, many simply assuming that leaving the EU would be a financial disaster and voting accordingly. The main issue at stake was what even some Euro-enthusiasts admitted was a “democratic deficit”: the complete lack of any accountability on the part of the unelected bureaucrats running the EU. To a nation proud of its Parliamentary traditions, this is a major issue.
Catholics in Britain were and are divided on Brexit. Some (I’m one) believe that the EU stands in opposition to Church’s understanding of the need for subsidiarity, i.e., the principle that decisions should be taken by the smaller and more responsible levels of community life rather than the larger, the opposite corollary being that huge, impersonal organizations and structures are contrary to real human needs. Others argue that the original ideals of the founders of the whole project could still resonate and that opposition is centered on nationalism and is small-minded, even bigoted.
Meanwhile, from the general Catholic perspective, Europe’s need is not for political union, but for re-evangelization and a great Christian renewal. Nationalism is on the rise and could do much harm. Something deep and real needs to be on offer.
Post-Brexit, Britain will need work closely with Europe. How could it be otherwise, when cheap jet flights, the Internet, mobile phones, and the Channel Tunnel combine to make isolationism merely a bizarre nonstarter every day of the week? We may joke about enjoying warm beer and village cricket, but the reality is that a multiracial Britain shares with the rest of Europe common concerns on everything from militant Islam to drug abuse and family breakup.
Brexit will turn out to be a good decision. But to resolve Europe’s real problems, we should look to that Christian faith that has shaped Britain and the rest of Europe for centuries—and pray for its revival.

Joanna Bogle is an author, broadcaster, and journalist living in London with her husband, a lawyer. Her most recent book is English Catholic Heroines...

sexta-feira, 24 de junho de 2016

Em menos de 24 horas, Bernie Sanders Desaprova e depois Aprova Hillary Clinton. A Pressão deve ter sido Gigantesca.

Essa é boa, eu nem consigo imaginar a pressão que ele sofreu durante a madrugada. Rm um programa de auditório ontem nos Estados Unidos, Em entrevista no programa Late Show, o comunista Bernie Sanders disse que não endossava Hillary Clinton. Quando perguntado ainda se ele indicava em quem os eleitores dele deveriam votar, ele disse que não ia dizer em que eles deveriam votar. Eles é que sabem. O entrevistador até tentou tirar o apoio a Hillary, mas não conseguiu.

Todo mundo sabe nos Estados Unidos que Trump está recebendo apoio de boa parte dos eleitores de Sanders. Essas declarações dele na verdade eram apoio a Trump.

Daí, pela manhã de hoje, em nova entrevista no jornal da MSNBC, Sanders votou atrás e disse que ia votar em Hillary e atacou Trump. Em menos 24 horas, o comunista mostrou claramente a sua hipocrisia nas telas de televisão.

Vocês podem ver os dois vídeos, um em que Sanders disse que não apoia Hillary, e o outro em que disse que vota em Hillary, clicando aqui.

terça-feira, 21 de junho de 2016

Governo é Mal Necessário ou Bem Necessário? Deve Ser Mínimo ou Máximo?

O professor Thomas Storck (foto acima) escreveu um excelente artigo sobre governo, seria o governo um mal necessário ou seriam um bem necessário, deveríamos ter um governo mínimo ou máximo?. No paraíso, o homem seria governado por outro homem ou seria livre?

Vejam parte do texto:

Toward the beginning of De Caelo (On the Heavens), Aristotle makes the well-known remark that “the least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousand-fold”—or, as it is sometimes phrased, “a small error in the beginning leads to a large error later on.” We can easily see that this is true, whether in immediately practical operations or, more importantly, in intellectual investigations. If our first principles are not right, how can the rest of our reasoning be correct? This is true concerning our thinking about government. Is government a necessary evil? A necessary good? Is that government best which governs least? In thinking about these questions, it is good not only to begin at the beginning but to begin with the right questions and their correct answers.
If government were a necessary evil, one reason for this might be that it was something that would not exist had man not sinned. Christians believe that God originally created one man and one woman whose nature was untouched by evil and who were given special gifts to perfect that nature, but who were then tempted by the Devil and sinned. Because of Original Sin, all their descendants lost those extraordinary gifts, although man’s basic nature remains good, albeit wounded. Had Adam and Eve never sinned, and had they begotten children in the state of innocence, would there have been a need for government? To some, this may seem like a useless question, as removed from reality as to ask what lunar landings would be like if the moon were made of green cheese. However, this question reveals something about the place of government among men. If we answer it the wrong way, we will commit the small error at the beginning of our inquiry which leads to a big error later on.
Thomas Aquinas proposes to himself this very question. In his Summa Theologica (I:96:4), he asks whether there would be subordination of man to man in the state of innocence. Yes, he answers very clearly. Although there would not have been the domination characteristic of the slave (servus), who is “ordered to another,” there would still have been the kind of subjection proper to the free man, when someone directs him to his own good or to the common good. And the reasons given by Saint Thomas for this are two: First, because man is “naturally a social animal,” and “social life cannot exist unless someone presides who aims at the common good”; and second, because it would be unfitting for someone to have “supereminence in knowledge or justice” unless he could use this supereminence for the good of others. In other words, according to Saint Thomas, had Original Sin never entered the world, we would still have had a sort of government, one that did not need to punish anyone but was still there to coordinate and direct our common projects toward the public good. Adam and Eve, after all, were not omniscient. If our hypothetical unfallen brothers had wanted to build a road or a dam or a bridge, they would still have needed to put it in this place rather than that, and someone would have had to make the final decision as to where.
By his answer, Saint Thomas was already guarding us against many wrong conclusions that we might reach. One of them is the notion that government is a necessary evil. Government, on the contrary, is a necessary good and has a natural role to play in man’s affairs; as we consider the question of the proper size and activity of government, we must keep this truth in mind.
If government is a necessary good, the question of the size and responsibility of government should be approached in the spirit, not of trying to see how small we can make it, nor how large, but of calmly looking at those tasks that man can accomplish only or best via government, and setting government’s proper bounds in response to man’s nature and needs....
If there is some social need that we do not think appropriate for direct governmental action, what alternatives do we have? Often, in the Anglo-American political tradition, we are presented with only three alternatives: direct government control, private charity, or some kind of market-based approach. This is by no means an adequate enumeration of all possible approaches, for we must consider the principle of subsidiarity, first enunciated by Pope Pius XI in his 1931 encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno. Subsidiarity holds that
Now, this principle is often misunderstood and misapplied. Some seem to think, for example, that it is calling for matters to be committed as often as possible to for-profit groups or private charity. The “lesser and subordinate bodies” that the Pope speaks of, however, are not necessarily purely private, let along for-profit. Nor are they necessarily devoid of real authority. Since, later on in this same encyclical, Pope Pius strongly urges the reestablishment of something like the medieval guilds, we can assume that he is not opposed to the assumption of real authority for the common good by some of these “lesser and subordinate bodies.”
In the political traditions common in English-speaking countries, this sort of arrangement would probably be called delegation of governmental authority to nongovernmental bodies...