segunda-feira, 29 de fevereiro de 2016

Um Recorde Negativo de Obama: 10 Anos de Crescimento Abaixo de 3,0%.


Toda vez que alguém fala que gosta de Obama, eu pergunto o que ele gosta mais em Obama, e daí, se essa pessoa não defende aborto ou casamento gay ou é muçulmano, eu consigo provar para a pessoa que ele não deveria gostar de Obama. A pessoa está mal informada.

Quando o assunto é economia, fica muito fácil rebater, e provar que Obama foi um desastre nesse aspecto.

Um texto da CNSNews revela um recorde negativo de Obama em matéria de crescimento econômico: 10 anos com crescimento abaixo da média histórica de 3,9%. Aliás, a média de Obama é 2,1%. Há outros recordes negativos de Obama relacionados ao mercado de trabalho ou aumento de uso de benefícios estatais ou de taxas de juros ou de compras de títulos pelo Fed, ou queda de produtividade.

O maior de tempo de crescimento abaixo de 3,0%, antes de Obama, foi de 4 anos, durante a grande depressão dos anos 30. Obama conseguiu o dobro.

O melhor período de crescimento foi nos anos do presidente Ronald Reagan.

Vejamos o texto da CNSNews.

U.S. Has Record 10th Straight Year Without 3% Growth in GDP


By Terence P. Jeffrey | February 26, 2016 | 4:05 PM EST
(CNSNews.com) - The United States has now gone a record 10 straight years without 3 percent growth in real Gross Domestic Product, according to data released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The BEA has calculated GDP for each year going back to 1929 and it has calculated the inflation-adjusted annual change in GDP (in constant 2009 dollars) from 1930 forward.
In the 85 years for which BEA has calculated the annual change in real GDP there is only one ten-year stretch—2006 through 2015—when the annual growth in real GDP never hit 3 percent. During the last ten years, real annual growth in GDP peaked in 2006 at 2.7 percent. It has never been that high again, according to the BEA.
The last recession ended in June 2009, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. In the six full calendar years since then (2010-2015), real annual GDP growth has never exceeded the 2.5 percent it hit in 2010.
“The average growth rate for economic recoveries since the 1960s is 3.9 percent ranking the Obama recovery, with an average GDP growth rate of just 2.1 percent, among the slowest in history,” said Sen. Dan Coats (R.-Ind,), who chairs the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress.
Before this period, the longest stretch of years when real GDP did not grow by at least 3.0 percent, as calculatd by the BEA, was the four-year stretch from 1930 to 1933—during the Great Depression.
In addition to that four-stretch from 1930-1933, there have also been four three-year stretches where the real annual growth in GDP did not go as high as 3.0 percent. Those periods were 1945-1947 (in the immediate aftermath of World War II); 1956-1958; 1980-1982; and 2001-2003.
The longest consecutive stretch of years in which the United State saw real GDP grow by 3.0 percent or better was the seven year period from 1983-1989, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.
The second longest stretch of years in which the U.S. saw real GDP grow by 3.0 percent or better was the six-year period from 1939 through 1944. (World War II started in Europe in 1939 and the U.S. entered the war in December 1941 when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.)
In the last two years, annual growth in real GDP hit a plateau of 2.4 percent.
“Real GDP increase by 2.4 percent in 2015 (that is, from the 2014 annual level to the 2015 annual level), the same rate as in 2014,” the BEA said in the press release it put out today when it published its revised estimate for GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2015.
In that quarter, according to today’s revised estimate, GDP increased at an annual rate of 1.0 percent.
In the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers that President Obama sent to Congress this week, the administration noted that it is projecting real GDP to grow by only 2.7 percent this year and by less than that in the following two years.
“Real GDP is projected to grow 2.7, 2.5, and 2.4 percent during the four quarters of 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively,” said the report.
Next week, the Joint Economic Committee will be holding a hearing on the president's economic report.
“Whether it is burdensome regulations, a broken tax code or a ballooning national debt, the Obama Administration’s policies are a dead weight on the economy,” said Sen. Coats. “Under this president, we continue to see stubbornly low workforce participation and historically high long-term unemployment rates.
“In order to boost GDP, we need to overhaul our tax code and strip away unnecessary government regulations to give employers the confidence they need grow their businesses and create new jobs. Congress can take action to help grow our economy, but we need a willing partner in the White House,” said Coats.
“On Wednesday,” said Coats, “I am chairing a JEC hearing on the President’s economic assessment, and we’ll hear from the Chairman of his Council of Economic Advisors, Jason Furman, on ways we can work together to improve economic growth.”


sexta-feira, 12 de fevereiro de 2016

Depois de 637 Cortes de Taxas de Juros e US$ 12,3 Trilhões, Mundo Continua em Recessão


Desde a crise de 2008, que o  mundo decidiu que faria uma solução keynesiana extremista para salvar a economia global, juros baixíssimo e até negativos e jogar muito, mas muito dinheiro no mercado, quase jogando dinheiro de helicóptero. 

E aí, o que ocorreu? Depois de oito anos, temos ainda economia global em ritmo de recessão.

Depois de aumentar pouquíssimo os juros em dezembro, o Federal Reserve (Banco Central dos EUA) já sinaliza que os juros por lá podem ficar negativos, como ocorre em alguns países europeus e no Japão.

Isso é, o mundo ainda não aprendeu que o tal "quantitative easing" não dá certo. Bom, não dá certo para salvar a economia, mas enriquece ainda mais os ricos, que vendem seus ativos que ninguém quer para os bancos centrais.

Foram 637 cortes de juros no mundo desde 2008 e 12,3 trilhões de dólares de compra de ativos por parte dos bancos centrais (enriquecendo muita gente) e nada, o mundo não retoma crescimento. Os Estados Unidos têm a pior recuperação econômica da história, não conseguem passar de crescimento da faixa de 2% desde 2008 e esse ano deve ficar abaixo disso. A Europa continua patinando e os países emergentes reduzem fortemente o crescimento. O Brasil....bom, o Brasil está em recessão profunda, e pior, com elevada inflação.

Vejam texto elucidativo do site Zero Hedge.

637 Rate Cuts And $12.3 Trillion In Global QE Later, World Shocked To Find "Quantitative Failure"
Tyler Durden's picture
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 02/12/2016 11:30 -0500
2016 is shaping up to be the year that everyone finally comes to terms with the fact that the monetary emperors truly have no clothes.
To be sure, it’s been a long time coming. For nearly 8 years, market participants and economists convinced themselves that the answer was always “more Keynes.” Global trade still stagnant? Cut rates. Economic growth still stuck in neutral? Buy more assets.
It was almost as if everyone lost sight of the fact that if printing fiat scrip and tinkering with the cost of money were the answers, there would never be any problems. That is, policy makers can always hit ctrl+P and/or move rates around. But in order to resuscitate anemic aggregate demand and revive inflation, you need to tackle the core problems facing the global economy - not paper over them (and we mean “paper over them” in the most literal sense of the term).
Well late last month, central banks officially lost control of the narrative. Kuroda’s move into negative territory reeked of desperation andgiven the surging JPY and tumbling Japanese stocks, it’s pretty clear that the half-life on central bank easing has fallen dramatically.
And so, as the market wakes up from the punchbowl party with a massive hangover, everyone is suddenly left to contemplate “quantitative failure.” Below, courtesy of BofA's Michael Hartnett is a bullet point summary of 8 years spent chasing the dragon... and a list of the disappointing results.
*  *  * 
From BofA                                                     
Whether the recent tipping point was the Fed hike, negative rates in Europe & Japan, or simply the growing market dislocations and macro misallocation of resources and wealth, the deflationary theme of “Quantitative Failure” is stalking the financial markets. A multi-year period of major policy intervention & “financial repression” is ending with weak economic growth & investors rebelling against QE.
In short, monetary policies of...
  • 637 rate cuts since Bear Stearns
  • $12.3tn of asset purchases by global central banks in the past 8 years
  • $8.3tn of global government debt currently yielding 0% or less
  • 489 million people currently living in countries with official negative rates policies (i.e. Japan, Eurozone, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark)
  • -0.92%, the most negative yield in the world (2-year Swiss government bond)
...have in 2016 led to a macro environment symbolized by...
  • BofAML’s Chief US Economist Ethan Harris cutting potential trend real GDP growth in the US to 1.75%
  • inflation expectations in both the US & Europe dropping below 2008 levels & a global profits recession
  • one of the most deflationary recoveries of all-time: in the past 26 quarters the nominal GDP of advanced economies has grown 11%
http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user92183/imageroot/2016/02/09/Hartnett1.png
and a significant impact on Wall Street...
  • a bear market in equities (median stock in ACWI is down 28% from its highs; 45% of global stocks (1123) are down >30% from highs)
  • bear market in commodities (10-year rolling return from commodities is currently -5.1%, the worst since 1938) & credit markets
  • $686bn of market cap loss for global banks since Dec 15th – the day before the Fed hiked - and worsening global liquidity conditions, which in-turn will likely cause bank lending standards to tighten further
http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user92183/imageroot/2016/02/09/Hartnett2.png
  • and, most conspicuously, falling bank stocks and falling bond yields suggesting that 6 years of QE has failed to arrest deflation.
http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user92183/imageroot/2016/02/09/Hartnett3.png
*  *  *
What comes next is anyone's guess but with China's credit bubble about to burst in spectacular fashion, we wonder how central banks plan to combat the ensuing hit to the global economy. After all, their counter-cyclical policy room is not only exhausted, they've now taken the easing bias so far into the monetary twilight zone that in Japan's case, things are starting to backfire and are becoming self referential (see the recently canceled JGB auction). 
Throw in the fact that $12.3 trillion in asset purchases has impaired liquidity across markets and you have the conditions for what could turn into a truly harrowing year not only for Wall Street, but for Main Street as well. The same Main Street that was allegedly saved by a "courageous" Ben Bernanke who started us all down this road 8 long years ago.

sábado, 16 de janeiro de 2016

90% dos Estudos Acadêmicos Estão Errados


Dois estatísticos provaram que entre 80 e 90% de todos os trabalhos acadêmicos (de economia a medicina), que usam estatísticas, ou estão errados ou nem sabem dizer se estão errados ou certos, em suma não respondem ao que pretendem responder.

É a idolatria ao chamado P-value estatístico que usa o P-value de forma errada. P-value não responde significância, nem relacionamento entre as variáveis, nem o impacto de uma sobre a outra, mas a enorme maioria dos trabalhos acadêmicos consideram que o P-value faz isso. Eu já falei disso aqui no blog ao mencionar o que William Briggs costuma dizer.

Abaixo capa do livro deles e em seguida parte do detalhamento do problema que vi no site Aflluent Investor. Leiam o resto no site.


WHY MOST OF THE STUDIES YOU READ ABOUT ARE WRONG


 | On January 15, 2016

Stephen Ziliak of Roosevelt University and Deirdre McCloskey of University of Illinois at Chicago have done the world of academic research the greatest, but least welcome, of favors. In their book, The Cult of Statistical Significance, in their own journal articles, and in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Professional Economic Ethics, they’ve meticulously gone through many thousands of journal articles and subjected them to scrutiny as to the soundness of statistical methods. Their survey uncovered an epidemic. Depending on the science of the journal (economics, medicine, psychology, or other) and the type of statistical abuse (use of sampling techniques where no samples have been taken, omission of definition of the unit of the metric tested, misinterpretation of the definition of ‘statistically significant’, absent of any information describing the magnitude of the effects, etc.) somewhere between 8 and 9 out of every 10 journal articles in the leading journals of science have serious flaws in their use of statistics. In that sense, the results of articles published in the likes of theAmerican Economic Review and New England Journal of Medicine are not just wrong in their statistical logic; they are worse than wrong, lacking enough statistical coherence and common sense interpretation of causes and effect sizes to even know what the reasonable conclusions are and how to evaluate them.
A lot of this is non-debatable. Statisticians know the rules: sampling methods are for situations in which there is sampling. P values—the most commonly used index for determining the “statistical significance” of a result—do not measure the probability that the theory is right nor do they tell the practical importance of the result, not even close.  Researchers should tell us the actual effects of a drug or fertilizer or economic policy in a clearly defined unit in a clearly defined unit. If a researcher tells us that unemployment goes down when the government increases stimulus spending, they should start by telling us how they are measuring unemployment and how much it changes with X% more stimulus: in hours worked? Minutes worked? Millions of people employed? Thousands…hundreds…tens? How much? When they tell us that some particular stock or bond characteristic causes higher returns, how much higher? When they say they are adding or reducing risk, how much risk, measured how? Statistics professors know that business and medical research students often get just enough information from their classes to be dangerous, enough to calculate ‘statistical significance at the 95% level’, but not enough to know what that actually means, what it proves and what it never can prove. FiveThirtyEight recently asked several prominent academics, on camera, to explain the P value. The results were less than confidence-inspiring, no matter what one’s confidence interval.

That’s a pretty big problem measured in any reasonable unit. P values rule our world. Anything that’s based on journal articles, medicines, weight loss studies, longevity data, public policy, class-action law suits. Every pitch I’ve ever seen from a money manager or consultant who is pushing an investment solution includes the claim that the results are statistically significant to a 95% level, or even a 99% level. Fortunes and even lives rise and fall with these things called P values. Ziliak and McCloskey persuasively argue they should not. P values do not and cannot provide the information we actually want, which is a sound set of interpretations of effect sizes and their meaning to actual decision making.
Here’s my shot at defining this variable upon which we all depend:
When a researcher does a study, he or she is usually dealing with two theories. One is their real theory (for example, momentum drives stock returns or this diet pill helps with weight loss) and the other is ‘the null hypothesis’ (momentum has nothing to do with stock returns or this diet pill has no effect on weight loss). In the diet pill example, the scientists give some people the real compound and some people get a placebo. Since it’s not practical to divide mankind into two groups of 3.5 billion each and give the diet pill to one group and the placebo to another, then some sample must be used. There are two schools of thought on the sample question: ‘randomistas’ (as they’re called by this year’s Nobel Laureate in economics, Angus Deaton) and balanced designers. Randomistas have been gaining influence in the policy arena for the past twenty years—particularly in poor and developing nations, where they conduct most of their randomized trials. Randomized controlled trials have been treated by journal editors as the ‘gold standard’ of publishability. ‘Double-blind, random-sample’ is a VIP pass to getting in print. The minority report (but growing) has been that random sampling allows biases to creep into the testing unexamined and that it’s better to design experiments so that variables such as age and gender and class are balanced. In other words, we can choose people randomly, in which case we’re bound to randomly get more boys than girls or vice versa (as happened in a famous study of Chinese students’ grades with and without eye glasses). Or, instead of letting the random number generator choose people, you choose people in ways designed to balance various characteristics. Otherwise you can get a situation in which girls turn down glasses and boys take them and then we’re really studying differences in grades between girls and boys when we think we’re studying the difference between glasses and the naked eye. This debate is still going on.
The problems are even worse in econometrics and finance, in which it is common to not sample at all. If a researcher has a data set, say Schiller’s PE values for the past century and those are compared to stock market returns, then there isn’t any real sampling. The whole universe of available data is used. In a case like that P values are not really applicable at all, and yet there they are plastered all over articles, and prospecti. Prospects sit through Power Point purgatory and what holds them there is the all-powerful P, which allegedly makes it all worthwhile.
Back to defining the elusive and dictatorial P values. Since we can’t test 7 billion people, we need some idea whether the 70 people we sampled give us results which are reasonably close to the 7 billion. So we average our samples and we look at the results and we ask this question: if the null hypothesis were true (if the diet pill has no effect or if eyeglasses do not affect grades or if GDP has no effect on stock market returns) how likely is it that we would get a result (a difference from the null) larger than the result we’ve actually got? The P value is a numerical answer to that question. The usual standard is a P value of 5% of less. If the calculated P value is considered low by some bright-line standard, below 5% (0.05), for example, then the result is called “statistically significant”; if not, not. That is, if P > 0.05, the result is said to be too likely attributable to random chance, and is neglected, perhaps not even published, no matter the real world effect–what Ziliak and McCloskey call the “oomph”–of the result. Ironically, this way of measuring randomness was chosen randomly.  Way back in 1925 R.A. Fisher, the father of the P value, simply decided that 5% was the threshold which henceforth and forevermore would determine statistically significance and thus (however erroneously) “importance,” so let it be written in the textbooks, so let it be done in society.
The P value doesn’t do the job it’s been charged with. Most people want to know: Does the diet pill work? How much will I lose, and with what probability? How sure are you that it will work? P values answer none of those questions. Instead researchers test the thing which we’re not really testing and we use a statistic which doesn’t tell us how big the effects are and our final vindication is a single number which is usually being used the wrong way. Many people, some of whom write journal articles, think this is the way it’s supposed to work, but it isn’t.
And it seems like the vast majority of general interest journalists who write articles which summarize journal studies get it wrong. A P value is not a test of whether wine and chocolate help people live longer or whether minimum wages raise unemployment rates. It doesn’t tell you whether increases in money supply increase gold prices. It doesn’t test the theory. It tests the non-theory. At best, the P value tells the likelihood of observing a larger difference in the sample between diet pills A and B, assuming there is no difference between the pills.  But that is not saying very much at all, even when P falls below the arbitrary 5 or 1 percent threshold. Small, unimportant differences will appear statistically significant, and large and important differences might escape detection on grounds that they are “insignificant” statistically speaking according to some censorious rule cooked up by a statistician or bureaucrat.
If the null hypothesis is tested with a P value less than 5%, it might mean that chocolate adds longevity or it might mean that something else added longevity, something which was not controlled for because the people were randomly chosen and randomness must rule in the land of the randomistas. It might even mean that the null hypothesis actually is actually correct. A P value of 5% means that you would erroneously declare “significance” one out of twenty times if the experiment is repeated (Ziliak and McCloskey and others have found they rarely are) and the sample was unbiased; the chocolate had no effect. But that also means that you would get these results, even if the null hypothesis was wrong 1 out of 20 times! You might just be unlucky enough to be reading the study which says that loads of alcohol are no problem for your liver, based on the 1 sample in 20 which would erroneously show that result. A P value of 5% basically says one time out of twenty a study using this method will give you the wrong conclusion. Be unlucky enough to read a study before 2008 and the data will show you that real estate is a very stable asset class and it will do it with an undeniably compelling P value.
Most of these criticisms of studies are non-controversial among professional statisticians. They know that statistical significance and P values are routinely abused. People who write these studies are not usually statisticians, though. They are medical researchers or economists or financial analysts who are using (or quite often misusing) statistical theory. The American Statistical Association is about to release a public statement from its sub-committee on P values (Ziliak is on the committee) to address the problem. But in the meantime, our lives, our laws, our planners, our doctors, our health insurers, our portfolio managers are governed by studies that are giving them a false sense of confidence about their conclusions, and then betting our assets and even our lives on that unstable foundation.
I sat down across a Skype line with Professor Ziliak recently to talk about nerdy statistics, beer, Guinnessometrics, weight loss, randomistas, economists keeping glasses from children who need them, race and IQ and how bad statistical theory empowered eugenics. A partial transcript (edited for clarity) can be found below:
BOWYER: I suppose if somebody were to ask me about this McCloskey-Ziliak school of statistical revision, and they wanted me to sum it up in a sentence that would sort of capture attention, it would be: here are the reasons why most of the studies you read are wrong.
ZILIAK: Yes.
BOWYER: So let me ask it to you that way.  Are most of the studies that we read in academic journals, studies that are done by economists, or in medical journals, are most of them in some significant way, when it deals with their statistical methodology, wrong?
ZILIAK: They might be ‑‑ a large fraction of them might be quite wrong in their conclusions.  What we can document and have documented already is that eighty to ninety percent of all published articles — and it varies by field from economics to medicine, but what we’ve shown from our decades-long surveys of the major journals of science from economics to medicine is that eighty to ninety percent of them have no idea if they’re right or wrong.  Reason:  they’re focusing on the wrong object.  They’re focusing on statistical significance rather than on what they should focus on, which is economic, or medical, or psychological, or wellbeing significance.
So if I was going to give you the one-liner, the one sentence to tell people who ask you in the elevator, I would say, as we say in the book, “Precision is nice, but oomph is the bomb.”  What you really want to know is about the oomph of your coefficient, the oomph of your economic inference, not how much you’ve controlled one kind of error ‑‑ random error measured by statistical significance.
BOWYER: So what you’re saying is we don’t even know enough to know whether they’re wrong.  Their methodology is such that it’s difficult to say whether they’re right or wrong because they’re looking at the wrong thing in order to support their conclusions.
ZILIAK: Exactly.  So, for example, one thing you need to know in order to make a quantitative assertion, and to defend that assertion in a company of peers, scientific and otherwise, is basic measurement of descriptive and summary statistics.  And in our surveys of the economics literature, McCloskey and I were alarmed to find the large fraction of papers don’t even tell you in what units the variables are being measured, let alone give averages and standard deviations so you can begin to figure out the real economic magnitude of their correlational and coefficients or their regression parameters, and that kind of thing.  So without that basic information from units of measurement to means, medians, standard deviations and other looks at the distribution of the data, we just have no idea, Jerry.  We don’t know if they’re right or wrong.
BOWYER: So if the studies say ‘if we follow this policy we’ll get a reduction in unemployment’, we don’t know whether this reduction in unemployment is in unemployment rate, unemployment hours, unemployment seconds, unemployment nanoseconds.  Right?  When we say ‘spend this much on a stimulus project, we have statistically significant evidence that it will decrease unemployment’, and the study doesn’t even tell you whether we’re decreasing it by minutes, seconds, or millions, or ones or twos.  We might be putting one person on the payroll, or we might be putting ten million people on the payroll; without putting your output in a unit, without saying what the unit is, we have no idea what the oomph is.
ZILIAK: Absolutely.  Absolutely.  It would be as if you’re taking your mother for Sunday brunch and the car runs out of gas, and you ask mom to push the car.  She might actually move it a small centimeter or two, but it’s probably not the best decision.
BOWYER: She’s never going to get you there.
ZILIAK: Exactly.
BOWYER: Right.  My mom’s tough; she goes for long walks every day, but she’s not going to push my car ten miles.
ZILIAK: I think my mom would go back to hitting me with the shoe rather than do that.
BOWYER: All right.  So this is the whole debate that we see in your book with Deirdre McCloskey, “The Cult of Statistical Significance”, and some of this material is also in your contribution to “The Oxford Handbook on Professional Economic Ethics”, which is just coming out now.
There’s this ongoing debate that actually goes back more than a century between something called statistical significance — that’s a kind of term of art — and oomph, which is your own term of art.  What are those two things?  What is statistical significance and what is oomph?
ZILIAK: Sure, yeah, good question.
Statistical significance, let’s start with that first.  So we all want to distinguish random from real error.  You know sometimes people make deliberate or undeliberate, that is unconscious blunders.  This could be measurement error, using incorrect units of accounting or incongruous units of accounting; that’s especially common.  In experiments on beer, you might be using very different types of barley malt or of hops that interacts differently with each other.  And some of the errors that you make will be real, and some will be random.  And the idea of the test of statistical significance is to try to estimate to what extent you’re looking at random variation.  And of course, the idea is to try to minimize that.
Statistical significance is the most widely used technique for saying whether or not a finding is important or not.  The problem with that is that statistical significance is neither necessary nor sufficient for proving commercial financial, spiritual, psychological, medical or other kinds of significance ‑‑ statistical significance cannot do the job.
So what is statistical significance?  Let’s say that you have a well-designed experiment or survey or historical study that generates data on some observations that you care about.  This could be regarding unemployment and inflation, minimum wage and employment.  It could be about the way one drug versus another drug affects people’s psychological well-being or their body weights.  Now, you do some basic measurements and you compute averages and medians and standard deviations, that is the variance of the data.  And you also calculate correlation coefficients between variables such as inflation and unemployment.  And that correlation coefficient is going to have a certain magnitude.  The closer it is to one the more the variables, such as unemployment and inflation, move together; the closer it is to zero, the less they move together, the less you know about their relationship.
Well, the test of statistical significance tries to tell you something about the likelihood of seeing the correlation that you’re actually looking at.  And so the idea is to imagine — and that’s unfortunately what most economists and other scientists do — they imagine a repetition of their experiment or of their survey, or whatever; they don’t actually repeat the study.  That’s something that’s really come out in this reproducibility crisis.
But, anyway, the point is that some of that correlation coefficient that you’re looking at is real, and some of it occurred for random reasons.  And the test of statistical significance tries to put a numerical figure on the amount of it that would be due to merely chance, or merely random reasons.
Now, you know, so one can think about many different examples.  But in general, what you’re trying to do with the P‑value is to say that object A is different somehow from object B.  And the way it gets worked out on the technical side goes something like this.  A null hypothesis is proposed.  And the null hypothesis means, in ordinary English, that there is no average difference, no difference in average or median effects between let’s say diet pill A and diet pill B, or between Irish barley Archer and English barley Archer.  So the null hypothesis stipulates in advance that there’s no difference in those two things, let’s say in the amount of weight loss ability from the pill or in yield of barley corn out in the fields across the two different barleys.  Okay.
BOWYER: Right.
ZILIAK: Then the p-value does what?  It says what’s the probability of seeing a bigger difference in effect sizes between the two things being compared?  What’s the probability of seeing a bigger effect size than the one that I’ve actually seen, that effect size being divided by the variation of the data.
So let me back up and say it one other way.  Historically speaking, the test of statistical significance was called student’s test of significance, student’s t-test of statistical significance.  And the t-test is measuring a thing that a lot of us can appreciate, and that is it measures the difference between object A and object B, divided by the variation within object A and object B. And of course under the strictures of the sample or the way that the data were experimentally designed.  So given the experimental design, what’s the variation within those two objects, those two things being compared?

The p-value is saying something else.  It says ‘assuming that there’s no difference between the two weight loss pills or the two barley yields, what’s the probability of seeing a difference larger than the difference we’ve actually observed in the data?’
...

terça-feira, 29 de dezembro de 2015

Mudança Climática: Seis Décadas de Erros de Previsão Climática


Climate models fail to predict warming


O site Daily Caller tratou ontem dos erros de previsão climática dos cientistas. Há seis décadas, eles só erram. E erram para cima, preveem que vai fazer mais calor. Vejam gráfico acima.

Por que será que eles erram tanto e recorrentemente? Será que eles querem acelerar as políticas públicas contra um suposto aquecimento global? 

Satélites mostram que não tem havido aquecimento da Terra, apesar de maiores emissões de carbono pelo homem.

Vejam texto abaixo.

Climate Models Have Been Wrong About Global Warming For Six Decades

By Michael Bastasch

Climate models used by scientists to predict how much human activities will warm the planet have been over-predicting global warming for the last six decades, according to a recent working paper by climate scientists.

“Everyone by now is familiar with the ‘pause’ or ‘slowdown’ in the rate of global warming that has taken place over the past 20 years of so, but few realize is that the observed warming rate has been beneath the model mean expectation for periods extending back to the mid-20th century—60+ years,” Patrick Michaels and Chip Knappenberger, climate scientists at the libertarian Cato Institute, write in a working paper released in December.

Michaels and Knappenberger compared observed global surface temperature warming rates since 1950 to what was predicted by 108 climate models used by government climate scientists to predict how much carbon dioxide emissions will warm the planet.

What they found was the models projected much higher warming rates than actually occurred.
         
“During all periods from 10 years (2006-2015) to 65 (1951-2015) years in length, the observed temperature trend lies in the lower half of the collection of climate model simulations,” Michaels and Knappenberger write, “and for several periods it lies very close (or even below) the 2.5th percentile of all the model runs.”

To further bolster their case that climate models are over-predicting warming rates, Michaels and Knappenberger looked at how climate models fared against satellite and weather balloon data from the mid-troposphere. The result is the same, and climate models predicted way more warming than actually occurred.
Satellites show even less warming


“This is a devastating indictment of climate model performance,” Michaels and Knappenberger write. “For periods of time longer than about 20 years, the observed trends from all data sources fall beneath the lower bound which contains 95 percent of all model trends and in the majority of cases, falls beneath even the absolute smallest trend found in any of the 102 climate model runs.”

“The amount of that over-prediction comports well with a growing body of scientific findings and growing understanding that the sensitivity of the earth’s surface temperature to rising atmospheric greenhouse gas levels… lies towards (and yet within) the low end of the mainstream assessed likely range.”
Satellite temperatures, which measure the lowest few miles of the Earth’s atmosphere, show there’s been no significant global warming for the last two decades despite rapidly rising carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere.

The so-called “hiatus” in warming has sparked an intense debate among climate scientists over what’s caused warming to disappear. Dozens of theories have been put forward as to why global warming has stalled, but no one has cracked the case.

Michaels and Knappenberger, however, suggest the “hiatus” and the previous decades of overblown temperature predictions point to a huge flaw in climate science: the climate isn’t as sensitive to CO2 as previously thought.

The Cato scientists argue “climate sensitivity” estimates are too high and are causing climate models to over-predict how much warming will happen with increases in greenhouse gas emissions. Climate sensitivity refers to how much warming would occur with a doubling of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.

Climate scientists typically put climate sensitivity at 3 degrees Celsius, but a slew of new studies suggest that’s way too high an estimate based on how much warming has been observed in recent decades. One estimate put together by the U.K.-based Global Warming Policy Foundation last year found climate sensitivity may be as low as 1.75 degrees Celsius — almost half what mainstream climate models use.


segunda-feira, 14 de dezembro de 2015

O Acordo do Clima de Paris - EUA admite que Reduzir Carbono Não tem Efeito, China pode Construir Usina de Carvão, Hansen chama de Bullshit,...


Aqui vão algumas notícias desanimadoras para os ambientalistas sobre os resultados da Conferência do Clima:

1)  É pior acordo na história, US$ 1,5 trilhão por ano para reduzir a temperatura em 0,048 graus, se ninguém mentir.

2) John Kerry admite que Reduzir Carbono não terá efeito nenhum.

3) Mesmo ambientalistas admitem que o Acordo de Paris foi completa perda de tempo. O Acordo não vale nada.

4) Acordo é dito ser apenas "tiger paper" (mentirinha) e não é verificável.

5) O criador dessa história de que carbono emitido por seres humanos provoca aquecimento global, o cientista James Hansen, chamou o acordo de "bullshit" (cocô de vaca)  e falso.

6) China e Índia poderão construir mais 2.400 usinas de carvão pelo acordo celebrado.

7) Acordo não incluiu setor de aviação e transporte, que são parte importante das emissões.

8) O milionário Maurice Strong que estabeleceu a agenda ambiental da ONU faleceu sem ver o resultado mais recente de sua empreitada. No passado, ele foi pego recebendo muito dinheiro ilícito.

Abaixo também um exemplo de bom texto sobre o assunto:

Unenforceable Paris Climate Agreement, ‘Worse than a Failure,’
Would Trap the Poor in Poverty if Implemented

Burke, VA, December 14, 2015—“The agreement reached at the Paris climate summit is worse than a failure,” said Dr. E. Calvin Beisner, Founder and National Spokesman of The Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation.

“The ‘commitments’ made in the Paris agreement are voluntary and unenforceable,” Beisner said, “which means most nations will not comply. EU nations said they would make binding commitments only if all major emitters did—and they didn’t. So the EU’s ‘commitments’ lose all substance.”

China and India, the #1 and #3 CO2 emitting nations, plan for their emissions to continue rising at least until 2030, and reductions even in rate of growth later will depend on whether they can be made without slowing their rise out of poverty. Other developing countries’ “commitments” are similar.

“That’s perfectly understandable,” Beisner said. “Risks from poverty are far greater than from climate change, so whatever slows economic growth means greater harm than global warming.” That thinking is behind the Cornwall Alliance’s petition, Forget ‘Climate Change’, Energy Empowers the Poor.

Full compliance with the Paris agreement would cost hundreds of billions of dollars per year beginning now and rise to $1–2 Trillion per year from 2030 onward. As Copenhagen Consensus Center President Bjørn Lomborg, pointed out, it would still reduce CO2 emissions by only 1% of the amount the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says is needed to limit global warming to 2˚C (3.6˚F) over pre-industrial levels.

Even the United States, despite President Barack Obama’s determined efforts, is unlikely to achieve its “commitments” to reduce CO2 emissions by 26–28 percent under 2005 levels by 2025. Even assuming all the regulations he has proposed survive judicial review, which is unlikely, their full implementation would achieve only about a 13–14 percent reduction.

The Paris agreement continues a “commitment” made by rich nations at the Copenhagen summit in 2009 to contribute $100 billion per year to help developing nations bear the costs of adaptation to changing climate and of CO2 emissions restrictions. But that fund has never materialized, and the rich nations “committed” to it only on condition that the poor nations would commit to emission reductions, which they did not.

Beisner said the most worthwhile outcome of the Paris summit is probably “the Breakthrough Energy Coalition, a global group of private investors who will support companies that are taking innovative clean-energy ideas out of the lab and into the marketplace,” as Bill Gates described it, saying, “Our primary goal with the Coalition is as much to accelerate progress on clean energy ….”

“But to the extent that the Paris agreement actually gets implemented, it’s a disaster for the poor around the world,” Beisner said. “It will slow their access to the abundant, affordable, reliable energy indispensable to rising and staying out of poverty, while achieving no discernable improvement in climate but diverting trillions of dollars from solving hunger, malnutrition, and disease.”



segunda-feira, 30 de novembro de 2015

Manifestantes Pró-Clima Destróem Homenagens aos Mortos do Terrorismo na França





Eles querem protestar, eles querem aparecer, eles querem destruir. E acham que com isso terão um mundo melhor. Vejam no vídeo abaixo, a vontade de aparecer de alguns. É uma desgraça.







 

quarta-feira, 25 de novembro de 2015

Apenas os Ricos e Esquerdistas nos EUA apoiam a Entrada de Refugiados Sírios.


Vejam a tabela acima, ela mostra que apenas os mais ricos e os esquerdistas (eleitores do Partido Democrata) apoiam a entrada de refugiados sírios nos EUA.

Eu  fico sempre intrigado quando vou a um jantar com a presença de pessoas "ilustres", elas têm opiniões completamente alheias à realidade do dia a dia, especialmente professores universitários, ricos ou diplomatas.

Esses grupos vivem em uma bolha, em geral são esquerdistas e ateus, e detestam qualquer conversa sobre religião.

Eles não vão conviver com os refugiados sírios, viverão cercados nos "campi" das universidades ou em ´condomínios fechados ou em outros países.

Como diz Sean Davis, esses grupos "mostram sua compaixão forçando as outras pessoas a terem compaixão para poder terem a consciência tranquila"

(Agradeço a informação ao site Weasel Zippers)